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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GAIL ElILLINGS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 17336

STANLEY T. FARLEY' et al.'
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
The
the

plaintiffs

payment

defendants

brought

provisions
for

of

this

their

action

seeking

respective

to

contracts

enforce
with

the purchase and sale of the plaintiffs'

the
tart

cherries in 1973.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The

lower

court

determined

that

the defendants had

agreed

to pay certain of the plaintiffs the same price that a competitor
of the defendants,
in 1973,

21-1/2

were entitled
f.'OUnd

for

Muir-Roberts Company,

cents

per pound,

and

paid

that

for tart cherries

the other plaintiffs

to be paid a reasonable price of 21-1/2 cents per

their

judament to the

cherries.

The lower court accordingly granted

individual plaintiffs for the difference between

the price paid by Muir-Roberts for similarly graded cherries and
the price paid by the defendants.

The court also found that the

defendants Baum and Farley operated as partners and thus held the
cie'f"nclant

Stanley

T.

Farley

jointly

liable

to

the

plaintiffs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The

plaintiffs

respectfully

request

that

the

judgment

the lower court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior
Utah

to

County on

Before

which

was

they operated

1973

and Peggy Baum owned real esta~E

Garn L.

1973

located
a

a

fruit

business which

tart cherries, apples, and other fruits.

processing pl:r,
processed sweet

'l'he Baums lost mane)

the fruit processing business in the years 1970, 1971, and Jr
By 1973 they had accumulated business losses for those Yb
totalling

$271,513.00.

By July

1973

they were

insolvent.

240).

Garn Baum had,
of

Utah,

wllich
Utah.

in accordance with the statutes of the S:·

furnished

he

incurred

Baum

had

a bond
as a

in 1971 to guarantee payment of dE:·

produce dealer 1 icensed by the Stat;

defaulted

in

the

payment of his debts a:

produce dealer and his surety was called upon to honor its tc'
In July of 1973 the Baums owed unpaid debts of at least $142.:
During the fruit harvesting and processing season of 1973 Garr
Baum

did

not

have

and

could

not have

obtained

the surety:

necessary to do business as a produce dealer in the Stat'
Utah.

( R.

Prior
was

241).

to

foreclosed

July
upon

197 3

by

the

land

which

the

Baums had c

the Bank of American Fork, a bcr:

corporation of the State of Utan.

On July 10, 1973 tr,e
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l;r

processing plant which previously was owned by the Baums was
owned by the Bank of American Fork.

On or about July 10, 1973,

the

fruit

aank

of American

Fork

sold

the

processing

plant and

land which had previously been owned by the Baums to the brotherin-law and sister of Garn L. Baum, Stanley T. and Ora B. Farley.
241) .

( R.

The
1::$aums

Baums

and

an

option

had

equipment

which

American Fork.
from

putting

that oaums'

Farleys

an

to purchase

the

Farleys

unwritten agreement

from

had

the

Farleys

purchased

the

from

that

the

land

and

the

Bank of

The Baums and the Farleys deliberately refrained
the

Baums'

option

in

writing

because

they

feared

creditors might be able to reach tLe property if the

Baums had it in their name.
·On

had

July

10,

1973

a

(R. 241-242).
letter,

plaintiffs'

Exhibit

2,

was

addressed to fruit growers in Utah County and was mailed through
the United States Mail.

The letter bore the name Garn L. Baum as

well as the name Fantasy Fruits.
of Ora

and

operating
name of
Fruits

Stanley T.

this
the

is

year."

company who

owned

Part of the
to use

by

Farley,

this processing plant will be

It

stated,

also

will

Stanley T.

"help"

Exhibit 2 stated, "Through help

"Fantasy

purchase

your

Farley,

Orem,

Fruits

cherries.
iJtah."

that Ora and Stanley T.

is

the

Fantasy
(R.

242).

Farley gave was

their property of an agreed value of $125,000 as a down

payment on the purchase of the property from the Bank of American
F~rk,

to

furnish

a

surety bonc1,

anc

obtain a

license

from
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the

1

State of Utah and the United States Department of Agricultur:
that

the

Fruits

processing

could

tiffs.

(R.

plant

purchase

could operate and so that Fan';

produce

from

persons

such

as the PL

242).

Muir-Roberts

is

a

partnershiJ? which does business o:

c,

commission merchant in Utah.

Prior to 1973 Muir-Roberts and

L.

in purchasing fruit from the f:.

Baum had

producers
Fruits

been competitors

of

in

County.
The

1973.

Muir-Roberts
graded

Utah

paid

scale.

for

Muir-Roberts

treasurer of
tart

for

Muir-Roberts

cherries

in

with Far.::

testifieo ,:
according t'.

1973

The tart cherries purchased by Muir-Roberts

graded by Federal inspectors.
pound

competed

Huir-Rooerts paid 21-1/2 cent':
Fantasy Fnr

cherries which graded 97% or better.

cherries were also graded by Federal

inspectors.

Fantasy Fro.

paid on a graded scale of 15 cents per pound for cherries gr;
95% and better.

The pr ice paid by both i'iuir-Roberts and Fane'

Fruits was reduced as the quality of the cherries declined.
242-243).

The plaintiffs Merrill Gappmeyer,
Gillman,

a

partner

in

Gil lrnan

Paul Hansen, andc'

Brothers,

were

promised oy '·

be.um that Fantasy Fruits would pay as n1uct: for tne tart che':
purchased from them as 11.uir-Roberts paid for tart cherries
it

purchased.

The

plaintiffs

Gillman 11ere not quoted a
11

good"

price

frorr.

Fobert

firm i:-rice,

·
rej'.lresentat1ons
maoe

Gail

Sillings anci ,,:

but expected to be a; ..
by

t.r'.e

de I'2:10ants.
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agreed

contract

nieyer,

Paul

pr ice

Hansen,

between

and

Fantasy Fruits

Gillman

round on a graded scale of 97%.
cherries
fantasy
97%.

sold

Garn

sold

the

tnat

was

fruitc..

of

cents

per

The reasonable contract price of
to

cents per pound on a gradeci scale of

Payson

Baum

L.

processed
pa id

to

was

such

the

cherries
growers

ciation which

and

tart

that

cherries

for
of

for

Fantasy

35 cents per puuno and

those

cherries

'c'rocessing

processed

received

as

Growers Association

testified

cherries

cents

per

Fruits

sold

the

that

~iuir

Roberts

The money

by Fantasy Fruits was

by fantasy fruits
by

testified

35

35 cents per pound.

delivered

TLe growers had

the

Fruit

sold

ch<0rr ies for

money which
cherries

21-1/2

association

oroces~.erl

sold

was

rr,anager

that

[JOUnd,

21-1/2

244-245).

The
that

was

Merrill Gapp-

by Earley Gillman and Robert Gail Billings

Fruits

(H.

Brothers

and

the

from

:c:ilaintiffs

the

sale of

to

Fantasy

to wait for payment until Fantasy Fruits

recieved

ct.erries of

payment
the

there fer.

Payson

The

cost of

Fruit Growers Asso-

included receivina the cherries, pitting them,

adding sugar in the customary manner, putting them in containers,
the

cc.st

of

tr.e

containers

'·13r.t o;nd equipment anc'

and

inclL:ding

also

ciepreciation

of

interest on the investrrer.i: of plant and

equipment, was 7.8 cents per pound.

Garn Baum testified that the

Fantasy Fruit operation was mere efficient than the operation of
ti.e ?ayscn t"rui t
- ... J

cents

Growers.

pr::r f-C'urci,

Thus, at the agreea purcnase price of

tc:-.ntasy Fruits had a profit on its opera-
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I

tion for processing cherries, before any costs of selling, sf
cents per pound or $114.00 per ton.

(R. 243, 245).

AP.GUMENT
POINT I
INASMUCH AS THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CONTRACT
PRICE TO BE PAID THE PLAINTIFFS DCES NOT CLEARLY
PREPONDERATE AGAINST THE FINL>INGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT, THIS COURT MUST UPHOLD THOSE FINDINGS.
The

plaintiffs

are

proceeding

in

equity to enforce:

payment provisions of their respective sales agreements wltr:
defendants.

Although

the

appeal

of

an equitable proceec:

permits a review of both the facts and the law, a

findi~

oft.

may be rejected only if the evidence "clearly preponderat;.
against
P.

the

2d 54

finding

made by the trial court.
In Ovard v. Cannon,

(Utah 1960).

Ryan v. Earl,'

600 P.

2d 1246, J..

(Utah 1979), the court stated:
It is true that in cases of equity this court may
weigh the evidence and determine the facts.
However, it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of the
trial court, there is indulged a presumption of
correctness of the findings ano judgment; and
that where the evidence may conflict we do not
upset the lower court's findings unless the
evidence clearly proponderates against them.
(Emphasis in original).
Likewise,

Knight v.

held

"[t)he

that

court on

Leigh,

court

issues of

fact

will

619 P.
not

2d 1385,

reverse

c,lone when there

1387 (Utah

1

a decision of a
is sufficient ev:o:·

to support the decision of the trial court."
The defendants contend

that there

~'

is no evidence to,:
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a contract price of 21-1/2 cents per pound for tart cherries
between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
summarizes
include

the

testimony of

the

testimony which supports

The defendants' brief

plaintiffs,

but it fails

the plaintiffs'

position.

to
For

example, Merrill Gappmeyer testified as follows:

Q You and Garn had these conversations.
A That's right.
Q As to the tart cherries or the sour cherries,
did you arrive at any price with him?
Did you
arrive at the price that he would pay you?
A That he would pay me?
Q The price that he would pay you for the sour
cherries?
A No.
The only conversations that we had as to
a final pr ice that I would be paid, was that I
would be paid what anybody else was paid.
0 Did you mention Muir-Roberts at all?
A Yes.
Q
And in what context was that mentioned?
A Just in the normal discussion that, "I'll pay
as well as Muir-Roberts or any of the other
processors."
(Trial transcript pp. 14-15).
\'lhen cross-examined by counsel for defendants Baum, Mr. Gappmeyer
testified:
Q You have indicated that Baum told you he would
do as well as others?
A That's correct.
C
That is, not only Muir-Roberts, but other
processors, as well?
A
The standard answer that I received in multiple conversations with him was, "Don't worry
about it.
I'll do just as well as anyone else."
One reason that I was concerned is because I knew
what the potential was.
Q i'.nd you took that to mean that he would do as
well as Nuir-Roberts?
.;
\<Jell, he specifically said as well as MuirPoberts in one conversation.
l''ri3l transcript pp.

24-25).
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Paul

Hansen

testified on direct

examination as follows,,

regard to conversations with Garn Baum:

Q What was said?
A
well we just negotiated on the cherries.
r
had been se 11 ing most of them to Muir-Roberts,
and he [Garn Baum] wanted the cherries, and I
told him I would bring him some.
And he said
that he would pay what the others was going to
pay.
Q
Did he make any reference to Muir-Roberts as
to what he would pay or what Muir-Koberts had
paid?
A No, not as such.
Q What did he say?
A
He just said that he would "meet him or beat
him," is what he said.
(Trial Transcript pp. 38-39).

Robert Gail Billings ther.

testified on direct examination:
Q
Did you have any conversation with him [Garn
Ba um] at the time as to the [Jr ice that you would
be paid?
A I think I asked something about, "How does the
price look, and he said, "It looks very good."
Q

Did he quote you a price?

A

Not at all.

(Trial

transcript

pp.

46-47).

On

redirect ex am i nation,

Billings explained his reason for joining this lawsuit.
i•ly reasonin<J on deciding to get into this
lawsuit went like this:
I felt that when rny
fruit is consigned to a buyer that doesn't quote
me a fixed price, he should do the very best tnat
he can in allowina the marketing considerations;
and the fact other buyers paic a significantly
higher price, I think that five cents ( .05 cents)
a pound is thirty-three ( 33%) nigher than he
paid.
I felt that he must not have been paying
~e the best that he could have paid.
(Trial transcript, p.

50).

-8-
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Mr.

Harley Gillman explained that in his prior dealings with

the 5aums,
paid.

they had paid very close to what other processors

He then testified:
Q
5ut as to yourself, you don't remember being
quoted a firm price?
A
No, not a firm price, unless Mr. Black is
construing this letter as a firm price, because
that figure nas been kicked around.
Q
Did you construe that letter as being a firm
price?
A
No, I did not construe that letter as being a
firm price.
No.
Q
So from your past dealings with Mr. Baum, you
felt that he would pay equal to what the other
processors would pay?
A
Yes.

Finally,

Mr.

Dean Gillman

testified

for Gillman Brothers as

follows:
Q Now, did you have any conversation at all with
Mr. Farley or Mr. Baum as to the price you would
receive in 1973?
A No, sir. Not before we took our cherries over
there.
I talked to neither one of them.
v All right. Did you have a conversation after
you took your cherries over there?
A
Yes.
I.!
Tell us when you had the first conversation,
who was present and the approximate time?
A Well, I would think it was the first or second
load of cherries taken over there.
I can't
remember when it was, exactly.
But I visited
with Garn many times.
I visited with him many
times.
He told me not to worry, that things
looked good.
He said, "If I can't make it this
year, I'll never make it again.
It looJ<s that
good."
He told me that.
fie says, "Don't you
worry," he says, "Ill pay you as much as MuirRoberts."
So we was happy, and we just kept
taking our cherries to him.
Q How many times did he tell you that?
A Well, iie assured me of that many times, that
there was nothina to worry about.
Q Had you sold ~herries to him prior?
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A
It could be that we
maybe we sold him a few
times, I thin!<, that we
all.
Q
Were you ever quoted
other year?
A Not to my knowledge.

sold to him in '71, and
in '68.
There is three
sold to him.
But that's
a

firm pr ice during the

(Trial transcript p. 67).

Q What w~re you told?
A
I was told that we had no worries, that we
would be paid as much as Muir-Roberts was paying.
Q And how many times were you told that?
A Many.
Many times.
(Trial transcript p. 74).
Mr. Greenwell, accounting supervisor and Secretary-Treas:
for

Muir-Roberts

Company,

testified

paid,

transcript p.
the

court entered

Paul Hansen,
based on

108).

Muir-Roberts,,

tart cherries graded 97% to 11>

21-1/2 cents per pound for
(Trial

that

Based on

judgment

Gail Billings,

the

scale that t\uir-Rote:

in favor of Merrill Gappie;

liarley Gillman, and Gillman Bret·

the difference between the graded scale paid bi·

defendants

and

the

graded

scale

paid

by

Muir-Roberts.

234).

Although the testimony of Garn Baum conflicted with tho:
the plaintiffs,
plaintiffs
Fruits

the

to the

would

court chose to believe the testimonv of

effect

meet

or

defendants

do

matter of

law,

but

it.

The

to

support

not

that Mr.

beat

the price paid by Muir-Roberts.

cnallenge
argue

Bau!l' represented that far

the

that

lengthy

lower court's decisicn •:

the evidence was ins~ifilC

recitation

above

Cierrun5trate
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there

is

substantial

evidence

supporting

the

existence of a

contract price equal to or better than that paid by Muir-Roberts.
Therefore,
decision

this

court

should

not

reverse

the

lower

court's

inasmuch as there is sufficient evidence to support it.

Knignt v. Leigh, supra.
In

Keesling v. Basamakis,

court explained

the

trial

weighing

court

in

539

P.

2d

1043

(Utah

1975),

the

importance of the advantaged position of the
the

credibility of witnesses

in

situa-

tions of conflicting evidence.
Plaintiff produced evidence tending to prove
the existence of a partnership.
Defendant
produced opposing evidence and further produced
evidence which tended to prove a joint venture of
the nature heretofore described.
The trial
court, exercising its prerogative as a trier of
fact in a nonjury case, weighed the credibility
of the witnesses, and was not persuaded by
plaintiff's evidence.
This court will not
disturb such a determination when reasonable men
could differ as to the weight to be given to
conflicting evidence.
539 P.

2d at 1046.

Accordingly,

the judgment of the lower court

should be affirmed.
POINT II
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDES THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACTS WITH THE
DEFENDANTS.
The

defendants'

contention

that

both

state

law precluGe the enforcement of the defendants'
pay ['rices equal

to Muir-Roberts

and

federal

contracts to

is simply without merit.

Even

if ~2nt3sy ~ruits is a produce dealer as opposed to a commission
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merchant,

there

is

no

provision

in

Utah

statutory or ca"

which prohibits a price agreement which relates to payments_
by third persons.

merchant and except a person who pays for
receiving

in effect dur.

that a dealer was any person except a commiso.

provided

1973,

Utah Code Annotated § 5-1-2,

possession of

obtains possession of

them,

who

for

farm products;:

the

purpose of re;,

farm products from the producer.

It:

not prohibit a dealer from taking possession of farm produw:
determining a price to be paid therefor at a future date.
Likewise,
21-1/2

cents

refer

to

so

federal
per

The

pound.

assiduously

Executive Order No.
sional

law did not preclude a contract price
pr ice

was

freeze

enacted

by

11723 on June 13, 1973.

and Administrative News, 1973, p.

which the defer.co ..
President Nixc,,
U. S. Code Cone:'
Section'

3496.

that order states that "[t]he provisions of this order shall·
extend

to the prices charged for raw agricultural produ::

Clearly,

then,

there

which

the

defendants

their

tart

cherries.

was

no

federal

could pay

1 imitation to the

C'

to the plaintiff growero

President Nixon's

Executive Crder l.

dated July 18, 1973, removed the pr ice freeze on food (exce~·
beef)

established

Cong.

&

court

by

Admin. }iews,

pursuant

to

· 1 notice
·
judic1a
of

Ex e cut iv e

Ord e r s

See u. 5.

Executive Order 11723.
1973, p.

Rule

9,

-~xecu t.ive

a pp e a r

in

3506.

Utah

The plaintiffs requlo:.

Rules

o r a er ,-~os.
the i r

of

Evidence, cc

11723 ana· 11no.

en t ire t y

i r,
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tr."

':<

hereto.
Accordingly,

neither state nor

federal

law precluded the

enforcement of a contract pr ice of 21-1/2 cents per pound of tart
cherries.
POINT III
THE FARLEYS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS WHETHJ:.:R IT t;E BY PRINCIPLES OF PART'NERSHIP,
AGSNCY, OR ESTOPPEL.
The

defendants'

9artnership
ana

the

nor

agency

defendc:nts

defendants'

final

cases

is

alleged

as

is

that

between

a matter of

439 P.

supra,

2d 497
to

and

(Ariz.
the

the

1968).

Arizona

re~

~~e

~ith

partners

is

neither

defendants
Apparently,

a

Baum
the

case

of

~er~~

facts of the present case.

controlling

The intention of the

only when

third

parties are

not

0yers v. Rollete, supra.

in this case.
defendants

is not the critical

The only important question is whether or

Farley should be held liable on the contracts

the plaintiffs.

et. seq.

is

However, neither of these

\ihether or not a partnership existeo
auestion

the

law.

involved disputes arr:onc; partners.

involved.

there

basis for this conclusion is this court's decision in

applicable

Myer~

anc

relationship

Farley

r;oesling v. Basamakis,
Rollette,

argument

In this regard, Utah Cece Annotated § 40-1-1

is determinative.

Section 48-1-3 defines partnership as

''an association of two or more persons to carry en as cc-owners a
.cusinf'SS
~

for

~c?ljing

profit."

The court found

that

the

"Farley's action

for the licenses and bond reauired to do business anc
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the

representations

and

in signing the checks of the company,

and are
(R.

a
in

they were operators of Fantasy Fn'.
they were partner,

jointly 1 iaole with the Baums to the plaintiffs herci·

235).

T·hese

business
their

that

facts constitute the defendants as co-owner'

for profit.

brief

that

the

Furthermore,

the defendants acknow 1,

Baums and farleys did

share profit'

some extent.
In any event, U.C.A. § 48-1-13 provides for the liabilit;
one who is held out as a partner even though in fact he is

ri~:

partner.
48-1-13
Partner by estoppel.--(1)
When a
person by words spoken or written or by conduct
represents himself, or consents to another's
representing him, to anyone as a partner, in an
existing partnership or with one or more persons
not actual partners, he is liable to any such
person to whom such representation has been made
who has on the faith of such representation given
credit to the actual or apparent partnership,
and, if he has made such representation or
consented to its being 1nad e in a pub 1 ic manner,
he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with
the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the
representation or consentin9 to its being made.
(a)
Vihen a partnership liability results, he
is 1 iable as if he were an actual mend::er of toe
partnership,
(b)
When no partnership liability results, he
is liable jointly with the other persons, if any,
so consenting to the contract or representation
as to incur liability; otherwise,. separetely.
( 2)
\.-Jhen a person has been thus represented
to be a partner in an existino partnership, or
11ith one or rr.ore persons r.ot actual partners, he
is an aoent of the persons consenting to such
represen-tai::ion to bind tneIT' to the same exter.t
and in the same ;;-,anner as thouch he were a
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I

partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely
upon the representation.
Where all the members
of an existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act or obligation results;
but in all other cases it is the joint act or
obligation of the person acting and the persons
consenting to the representation.
Furthermore,

there can be no doubt that Fantasy Fruits was

owned at least in part by Mr. Farley.

Exhibit 2 expressly states

that "Fantasy Fruits is the name of the company who will purchase
your

Fantasy Fruits

cherries.

Orem,

lltah."

between

is owned

Whatever else may have

the Baums and the Farleys,

by Stanley T.
been

the

Farley,

relationship

it is clear that Mr.

Farley

was an owner of Fantasy Fruits and that the Baums acted on behalf
The plaintiff growers relied on the backing

of Fantasy Fruits.

of Mr. Farley in bringing their cherries to Fantasy Fruits.
Farley is therefore
of whether or not
relationship.

jointly liable to

Mr.

the plaintiffs regardless

there was an actual partnership or agency

See 2A C.J.S. Agency

~§

56-61.

CONCLUSION
The

facts as founa by the trial court are sufficient to

establish the existence of valid contracts between the plaintiffs
an6 the defendants for the sale and purchase of the plaintiffs'
~art

cherries for the price of 21-1/2 cents per pound, according

to the scale paid
this contract

is

by Muir-Roberts Company.

The enforcement of

not precluaed by either state or federal

law.

TGc evidence also establishes the existence of a partnershir
cr,t· "er

t:ie

defenc2.nts Baum anc' Farley and that the Farleys
-15-
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~re

jointly

liable

Therefore,

for

the

the

amounts

owed

to

the

plaintiffs ner;

plaintiffs respectfully

request that·

court affirm the judgment of the lower court .
Dated:

March

.:.;

-~---

'

i 9 81.

Respectfully submitted,

.,/_c'wc,,1,,;;,,._/z../ ::/t•-(<,,r

DALLAS H.

YGUNG,

·

JR·./·-7----

tlAILING CERTIFICATE

Mailed two copies of F.espondents' 5r ief, postac;e prep:
to Robert N. ~ic.cri, attorney for appella[l~ 738 Scutn :,
East , Sa 1 t Lake C i t y , U t ah 8 4 1 O2 th is _ _/.£_:::___ day of ; ;c:
1981.

LALLAS h.

0

YOUNG,

JR.

,

-_!.Q-
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EXECl'TffE ORDERS
No. 11 i22
June 12, 1973. 38 F.R. 1543i
INSPECTION OF INCO~!E. ESTATE. AND GIFT TAX RETCR:-.:s BY
THE COMMITTEE ON 1:--;TERNAL SECURITY. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
By virtue of the authority Yested in me by section 6103(aJ of the
Internal Revenue Code of 195-J. as amended 1.::!6 e.sc. 6103!a1),ti1 it
is hereby ordered that any income. estate, or gift tax return for the years
1964 to 19i4, inclusi\·e. shall. during the :\inety-third Congress. be open
to inspection by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof. for the purpose
of carrying on those investigations authorized by clause 11 of Rule XI
of the Rules of the House of Representati\·es
Such inspection shall be
in accordance and upon compliance with th€' rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in Treasury Decision ~132. relating to the inspection of returns by coma11ttees of thP Congress. approved by the President on ~fay 3, 1955
RICHARD
THE

:\"rxox.

\YmTE Hol-sE,
June 9. 1978.

No. lli23
June 15, 1973, 38 F.R. 15765
Fl'RTHER PROVIDING FOR THE STAB!LIZATIO;-.;
OF THE ECO!\'OMY
On January 11, 1973 I issued Executive Order 11695 1:::: which pro,·ided for establishment of Phase III of the Economic Stabilization Program
On April 3 0. 19 i 3 the Congress enacted, and I signed into law. amendments to the Economic Stabilization Act of 19 j() r.3 which extended for
one year. until April 3n. 1974. lhe !egislati,·e authority for carrying out
the Economic Stabilization Program
During Phase III. labor and management have contributed to our stabilization efforts through responsible collecth·e bargaining. The American people look to labor and management to continue their constructi\"e
and cooperative contributions. Price beha,·ior under Phase III has cot
been satisfactory, howe,·er.
I ha\"e therefore determined to impose a
cornprehensiYe freeze for a maximum period of 60 days on the prices of
all commodities and ser\"ices offered for sale except the prices charged for
raw agricultural products. I ha\"e determined that this action is necessary to stabilize the economy, reduce inflation, minimize unernp!oyment,
improve the :-..·auon ·s competitiYe position in world trade and protect the
purchasing power of the dollar. all in the context of sound fiscal management and effective monetary policies.
:'\iO\V, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority Yested in we by the
Constitution and statutes of the Cnited Stares, particularly the Economic
Stabilization Act of 19i11, as amended, it is hereby ordered as follows
Section 1
Effective 9 rin p. m .. e. s. t.. June 13, 19i3, no seller may
charge to any class of purchaser and no purchaser may pay a price for
any commodity or service which exceeds the freeze price charged for the
same or a similar corumoditr or serYice in transactions with the same
61.
62.
p

2G (IR C.l954J § 6l03(al
l".S Code
Cong
&
Adm
3471

63.
~e\\

l~

1· :-; (_' _\

~

191.1-I nott'

s

3496
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EXECl'TIVE ORDERS
class cf purchaser during the freeze base period. This order shall be
eftectin' for a maximum period of 6fi days from the date hereof. until
11 59 P m., e. s. t. August 12, 1973. It is not unlawful to charge or
pay a price le~s than the freeze price and lower prices are encouraged.
Sec. 2
Each seller shall prepare a list of freeze prices for all commodities and sernces which he sells and shall maintain a copy of that list
arn1lable for public inspection. durini: normal business hours, at each
place of business where such commodities or services are offered for sale.
In addition. the calculations and supporting data upon which the list is
based shall be maintained by the seller at the location where- the pricing
decisions reflected on the list are ordinarily made and shall be made
a\ai!ahle on request to representati\·es of the Economic Stabilization
Program
Sec. :l
The pro\'is1ons of this order shall not e;..Lend to the prices
charged for raw agricultural products
The prices of processed agricultural products. howeYer. are subject to the pro\'is1ons of this order. For
thosE- agricultural products which are sold for U)[imate consumption in
their original unprocessed form. this proYision applies after the first salf'.'
Sec 4
The pro\·isions of this order do not extend to (al wages and
salaries. which continue to be subject to the program established pursuant to Executh·e Order 11695(b1 interest and dh·idends. which continue to be subject to the program established by the Committee on
!nteresf and DiYidends and (Cl rents which continue to be subject to
controls only to the limited extent pro,·ided in ExecutiYe Order 111)95.
Sec. 5. The Cost of LiYing Council shall de,·eJop and recommend to
the President policies, mechanisms and procedures to achieYe· and maintain stability of prices and costs in a growing economy after the expiration of this freeze. To this end, it shall consult with representati\·es of
agriculture. industry, labor. consumers and the public.
Seic. 6
(a 1 Executi\·e Order 11695 continues to remain in full force
and effect and the authority conferred by and pursuant to this ordf'r
shall be in addition to the author1tr conferred by or pursuant to E.-.:ecut1·;;:- Order 11695 including authorit:r to grant exceptions and exemptions
under ~~·J'ropriate standards issued pursuant to regulations.
1b1 All power:s and duties delegated to the Chairman of the Cost of
Llnng Council by Executfye Order 11695 for the purpose of carryinc:
out the pro,·isions of that order are hereby delegated to the Chairman of
the Cosr of Lh·ing Council for the purpose of carrying out the pro,·isions
of this order.
Sec. 7
\\'hoeYer willfully violates this order or any order or regulation contrn ued or issued under authoritv of this order sha!l be subject to
a fine of not more than $5,000 for each .such dolation. 'Yhoe,·er Yiolates
1his order or any order or regulation continued or issued under authority
of this order shall be subject to a ciYil penalty of not more than $2,5i'l4l
for each such Yiolation.
Sec. 8
For purposes of this Executi\·e Order. the followin? definit!ons apply·
''Freeze price" means the highest prict> at or abo\·e which at least 11 1
percent of the commodities or services concerned were priced by the
seller in transactions with the class of purchaser concerned during the
freeze base period.
In computing the freeze price, a seller may not
E-xclude any temporary special sale, deat or allowance in effect durin~
thtt freeze base period
"Class of purchaser" means all those purchasers to whom a seller has
charc- ... rl a comparable price for comparable commodities or services dur·
in,e; the freeze base penod pursuant to customary price differentials bet"" e ... n those purchasers and other purchasers
"F'reeze base period" means
i a 1 thf" period June 1 to June 8. 19';'::'.; or

3497
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS
(bl

In the case of a seller \vho had no transactions during that period
the nearest preceding seven-day period in which he had a transaction.

"Transaction" means an arms length sale between unrelated persons
and is considered to occur at the time of shipment in the case of conimodities and the time of performance in the case of sernces
HJCHARD Xrx0,·.

June 13, 197;3.

3498
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS
No. lli30
July 19. 1973. 38 F.R. 19345
Ft:RTHER PROVIDI:'>G FOR THE STABILIZATION
OF THE ECO:-<O~IY
On June 13, 1973. I ordered a freeze for a maximum period of 60
days on the prices of all commodities anrJ services offered for sale except
the prices charged for raw agricultural products. At that time. I stated
that the freeze period ~·ould be used to de\elop a new and more effecti\·e
system or controls to follow the freeze. Planning for the Phase IV program has proceeded rapidly and I ha\·e. therefore. decided that the freeze
on food. except for bfef, should be remo\·ed and more flexible controls
substlluted in a two-stage process in the food industry. The first stage
wiil be effective at 4 u11 p. m .. e. s. t., July 18. 1973. The freeze in other
secrors of the economy will continue through August 12. 1973. I am
also directing the Cost of Linng Council to publish for comment now.
proposed plans for Phase IV controls in other sectors of the economy I
ha\-e determined that this action is necessary to stabilize the economy,
reduce mflation. minimize un'emptoyruent. iruproYe the :\'ation's corupetiti\e position in world trade and protect the purchasing power of the
dollar. all in the context of sound fiscal management and effecti,·e monet::i.ry policies.
:\"O\\·, THEREFORE, by Yirtue of the authority \'ested in me by the
Constnution and statutes of the enited States. particula"rlY the Economic
Stabilization Act of l 9ir1.'.:I as amended. it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. ExecutiYe Order 11'723 l<i establishing a freeze on prices
tffective 9:0f1 p. m. e. s. t., June 13. 1973, for a maximum period of 6L1
days 1s hereby superseded except as hereinafter proyided. Under the pronsions of E:-..ecu ti\·e Order 11695,11 the freeze regulations issued by the
Cost of Li\·ing Council. pursuant to the authority of Executi\·e Order
lli23 remain in effect except as the Chairman of the Cost of Living
Council may modify them. The price freeze established by ExecutiYe
Order lli'2~ remains in effect until 11:59 p. m., e. s. t., August 12. 1973,
e:-..cept to the extent the Chairman of the Cost of Lh·ing Council mar
modify it
Sec 2. Ali orders. regularions. circulars. rulings, notices or other
directin·s issued and all other actions taken by any agency pursuant to
E_,ecuti\-e Order 11723. and in effect on the date of this order are hereby
confirmed and ratified. and shail remain in full force and effect unless
or until altered. amended. or re\·oked by the Chairman of the Cost of
LJ\·ing Council.
Sec. 3. This order shall not operate to defeat any suit, action, prosecution. or admlnistratiYe proceeding. whether heretofore or hereafter
commenced. with respect to any right possessed, liability incurred, or
qffense committed prior to this date.
Sec. 4. Executive Order 11695 continues to remain in full force and
.:-ffect
Rrcx..um Xrxox.
THE "'HITE

HorsE,

July 18. 1978.
9. 12 L" SC A. ~ 19n.-1 note
10. 1973 L. S.Code Cong. & Adm.:-;'ews
p 3496

11. 1973 t.r.S Code Cong. & Adm.Xew9
p. 34jL

3506

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

